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The Constitutionality of the
Regulation of Abortion
By JoHN T. NOONAN, JR.*
IN a variety of ways Anglo-American common law and California
statutory and case law have developed a recognition of the legal per-
sonality of the human fetus. The fetus is now treated as a being
capable of inheriting property,1 suffering tortious injury,2 and under
some circumstances, having his rights preferred to adults.3 By virtue
of these developments in the law, the fetus is the center of legal interests.
The basic premise of this article is that if the state may restrict the free-
dom of individuals to impair these rights of the fetus, it may also re-
strict the freedom of individuals to destroy the fetus itself.
The State's Interest in Preserving Fetal Life
The approach of the courts is not a Pickwickian one, making
something that does not exist in nature exist in law; it is a true evolution
of the law in response to established medical and biological data. The
rights conferred by case law and statute on the conceived being are
conferred on a being qualitatively distinct from the spermatozoon and
ovum that originally meet to form it. The newly conceived fetus pos-
sesses something not possessed by its individual components, the genetic
(DNA) code, which transmits the human constitution.4 At the same
time, this new being represents a dramatic jump in potentiality for sur-
vival. Of the approximately two million spermatozoa in a normal ejacu-
lation, only one has a chance of developing into a zygote," and of the
one million o6cytes in a female at birth, 390 at most have a chance of
becoming ova;' but once spermatozoon and ovum meet and the con-
ceptus is formed, there is an 80 percent chance that unless deliberately
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. E.g., CAL. PRoB. CODE § 250; see text accompanying notes 4-12 infra.
2. E.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); see note 25 infrq.
3. E.g., Barnett v. Pinkston, 238 Ala. 327, 191 So. 371 (1939).
4. See F. GormmD, DEVELOPMENTAL GENEICS 17 (1966).
5. J. BAxTER, FRAzER's MANUAL OF EMBRYOLOGY 5 (3d ed. 1953).
6. G. PiNcus, THE CONTROL OF FERTmrrY 197 (1963).
aborted, the being will be delivered as a living child.7 It is under-
standable then, that the law, looking at this new being who has such
a high probability of life, has recognized the fetus as a possessor of rights
and interests.
Property Rights
The first area in which the rights of the fetus, at all stages of fetal
existence, were recognized by the law was in the realm of property law.
In Doe v. Clark' an English court interpreted the ordinary meaning of
"children" in a will to include a child in the womb. "An infant en
ventre sa mere, who by the course and order of nature is then living,
comes clearly within the description of 'children living at the time of his
decease.' "" Thellusson v. Woodford ° rejected the contention that this
was a mere rule of construction invoked for the benefit of the child.
"Why should not children en ventre sa mere be considered generally as
in existence? They are entitled to all the privileges of other persons.""
To the argument that such a child was a non-entity, the court replied:
Let us see what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in a
recovery, though it is for the purpose of making him answer over
in value. He may be an executor. He may take under the
Statute of Distributions. . . . He may take by devise. He may
be entitled under a charge for raising portions. He may have an
injunction; and he may have a guardian. 1
2
When the English property rules were adopted by American courts,
the same approach was taken. In Hall v. Hancock 3 the issue was
whether a bequest to grandchildren "living at my decease" was valid.' 4
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was asked to say that "in
esse" was not the same as "living," and that for a child to be "living,"
the mother must be at least "quick."' 5 The court held, however, that a
conceived child fell within the meaning of the word "living":
[A] child en ventre sa mere is a person in rerum naturd, so that,
both by the rules of the civil and common law, he is to all intents
and purposes a child, as much as if born in the father's lifetime.16
This development of Anglo-American common law has been codi-
7. Id.
8. 126 Eng. Rep. 617 (C.P. 1795).
9. Id. at 618.
10, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (C.P. 1798).
11. Id. at 164 (Buller, J.).
12. Id. at 163 (Buller, I.).
13. 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834) (Shaw, C.J.).
14. Id.
15. A "quick child" is defined as a child "that has developed so that it moves
within the mother's womb." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1415 (4th ed. 1951).
16. 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) at 258, Shaw, C.J., quoting Wallis v. Hodson, 26 Eng.
Rep. 472 (Ch. 1740).
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fled in California. Section 250 of the Probate Code provides that
"[a] posthumous child is considered as living at the death of the par-
ent. . . ." and section 255 of the Code, amended as recently as 1961,
provides that an illegitimate child is the heir of his mother, whether
the child is "born or conceived."
The property cases establish two propositions. First, when the
ordinary person employs the word "children" in a will, he is understood
to include in that term children conceived but not yet born. This
interpretation has not been criticized as fanciful or arbitrary, nor has it
been imposed by a court in pursuance of some theological scheme.
Rather, it has been generally accepted as a fair interpretation of the
ordinary use of language and of the ordinary person's conception of who
are "children." Second, a child in the womb has rights in property
transmitted by trust, will, or the laws of intestate succession to a class
of persons within which that child falls. From these propositions it
follows that the state may properly protect the safety of those whom
ordinary language designates as "children," and that it may properly pre-
vent the unregulated extinction of those who may possess property. It
would indeed be a strange inversion of values if it were a crime for a
parent to fraudulently appropriate the income of an unborn fetus, but
no crime to destroy the recipient of that income.
Tort Law
In the area of tort law, there has recently been a dramatic improve-
ment in the legal status of the fetus. Well into the twentieth century
most American decisions denied recovery in tort to human offspring
harmed while in the womb.:" This denial was justified in part by the
danger of fraudulent claims, and in part by the difficulty of proving
causation, but principally on the ground that "the defendant could owe
no duty of conduct to a person who was not in existence at the time of
his action."18 This theory was succinctly expressed by Justice Holmes
in Dietrich v. Northampton:9 "[T]he unborn child was part of the
mother at the time of the injury . - "
The California legislature has pioneered in rejecting this doctrine.
Section 29 of the Civil Code provides: "A child conceived, but not yet
born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far as may be necessary for
17. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 354 (3d ed. 1964) [herein-
after cited as PROSSER].
18. PROSSER 355.
19. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
20. Id. at 17.
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its interests in the event of its subsequent birth." In Scott v. McPhee-
ters2' the court held that on the basis of this code section a child might
sue for an injury incurred in delivery.
The respondent asserts that the provisions of section 29 of the
Civil Code are based on a fiction of law to the effect that an unborn
child is a human being separate and distinct from its mother. We
think that assumption of our statute is not a fiction, but upon the
contrary that it is an established and recognized fact by science
and by everyone of understanding.
22
Since 1946 most American courts have followed the California
approach.23  For a time there was hesitation about whether the per-
missible group of plaintiffs was limited to infants who were "viable," 24
or "quick,"25 at the time of the injury; 26 but the majority of courts have
imposed no such limitation on the right to recover.2' 7  "Viability" of a
fetus is not a constant, but depends on the anatomical and functional
development of the particular baby.28 It can also depend on the en-
vironment to which the fetus is delivered, as has been demonstrated
clinically with animals. 29  There seems no good reason to condition the
rights of a fetus on the shifting and uncertain standard of age within the
womb. As Professor Prosser observes: "Certainly the infant may
be no less injured; and all logic is in favor of ignoring the stage at
which it occurs." 30
In six states recovery for any injury to the fetus is conditioned on
the child being born alive.3" This result has been reached because of
21. 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
22. Id. at 634, 92 P.2d at 681.
23. Prosser states: [A] series of more than thirty cases, many of them ex-
pressly overruling prior holdings, have [sic] brought about the most spectacular abrupt
reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts. PROSSER 355-56.
24. "This term [viable] is applied to a newly-born infant, and especially to one
prematurely born, which is not only born alive, but in such a state of organic de-
velopment as to make possible the continuance of its life. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1737 (4th ed. 1951).
25. See note 15 supra.
26. See PROSSER 356.
27. See id. 356-57 and 356 n.44 (citing nine jurisdictions).
28. See J. MORIsoN, FETAL AND NEONATAL PATHOLOGY 99-100 (1963). The
weight and length of the fetus are better guides than age to the state of fetal develop-
ment; however, weight and length vary with the individual. See Gruenwald, Growth
of the Human Fetus, 94 AM. J. OF OBSTET. & GYN. 1112 (1966). Moreover, dif-
ferent racial groups have different ages at which their fetuses are viable. For
example, there is some evidence that Negro fetuses mature more quickly than Caucasian
fetuses. See J. MORISON, supra at 101.
29. Brinster & Thomson, Development of Eight-Cell Mouse Embryos in Vitro,
42 EXPERIMENTAL CELL RESEARCH 308 (1966).
30. PROSSER 356-57.
31. Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Prabbels
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the difficulty of proof, the danger of double recovery (if a mother
also sues for miscarriage), or the peculiarity of the language in a
wrongful death statute. 2  Norman v. Murphy33 is the only California
case falling within the last of the above rationales. There the court
held that a 4Y2 month old fetus killed as the result of an automobile
accident was not a "minor person" within section 377 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.1
4
Assuming arguendo that Norman v. Murphy is controlling Cali-
fornia law, does its holding impair the rule of Scott v. McPheeters5
that a child injured in the womb has legal rights? It is apparent that
the requirement of survival to birth says nothing about what rights may
be infringed before birth; after all, at common law before the enact-
ment of the wrongful death acts, "[i]f it were conceded that killing the
plaintiff was a tort toward him, he was none the less dead, and the tort
died with him.""es It could not be maintained that no injury was done by
destroying the person; the nature of the injury simply prevented recovery
for the wrong. Nor could it be said that the law did not recognize a
trespass, an assault and battery, and medical malpractice torts simply
because none of these actions survived if the plaintiff died.37  Plainly,
if a cause of action arises for an injury inflicted at a given time, a
legally protected interest must have existed at that time and no require-
ment of survivorship can detract from the recognition of its existence.
Thus, in the cases requiring the fetus to survive, a legal personality is
recognized as existing in the womb; it may be tortiously invaded even
though redress for the tort may come only if the further requisite of
birth is met.
The foregoing discussion has been premised on the assumption that
Norman v. Murphy is the prevailing law in California. It may be,
however, that in a future case the California Supreme Court will follow
the majority rule and permit recovery although the fetus dies because
v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); In re Logan's Estate, 3 N.Y.2d
800, 144 N.E.2d 644, 166 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217
(Okla. 1953); West v. McCay, 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958); Hogan v. Mc-
Daniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
32. PROSSER 357.
33. 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954), criticized in Gordon, The Unborn
Plaintiff, 63 Micr. L. REv. 579, 596 (1939).
34. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 377: "When the death of... a minor person who
leaves surviving him . . .father or mother, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages
against the person causing the death. . ....
35. Case discussed in text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
36. PaOSSER 923.
37. See generally id. at 920-23.
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of the tort. 8 The trend is reflected in the Massachusetts case of
Torigian v. Watertown News Company,89 in which the defendant's truck
had negligently struck the intestate's mother, who was 3 months
pregnant with intestate at the time. The impact caused the fetus' pre-
mature birth and subsequent death eight weeks after the accident. As
the court put it: "There was medical testimony that the accident of
January 2 was the adequate cause of the premature birth, and that the
cause of death was prematurity."40  Death was thus caused by one of
the classic methods of abortion, forced premature delivery of a non-
viable fetus. The court had to decide whether an action in tort lay for
such death: "We are not impressed with the soundness of the argu-
ments against recovery. They should not prevail against logic and jus-
tice."' 41 The fetus was held to be a person covered by the state's
wrongful death statute.42
The revolution in tort law has recognized rights in the fetus at
every stage of life and has refused to condition recovery on survivor-
ship. The dean of authorities on tort law notes that all writers on the
subject have maintained "that the unborn child in the path of an auto-
mobile is as much a person in the street as the mother . . . . 4 Can
such a child become less a person when, instead of an automobile,
another agency is directed to his destruction? If the state may protect
this person by allowing court action awarding damages for tort, it should
not be impotent to protect the same being by criminal sanctions.
Preference for the Fetus over the Parents
Despite the precedents of property and tort law recognizing the
rights of the fetus, it might be argued that the law does not accord this
recognition where the interests of the fetus clash with those of his par-
ents. The modem civil law that has developed in this unusual area,
however, is to the contrary. Where the life of the fetus is in balance
with some lesser interest of the parent, the fetus has been preferred.
44
38. See id. at 357.
39. 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
40. Id. at 447, 225 N.E.2d at 926.
41. Id. at 449, 225 N.E.2d at 927.
42. Id. The tort development of the legal rights of the fetus is taken as a prime
example of the effect of scientific development on law in E. PATrERSON, LAW I
A SCIENTIFIc AGE (1963). The author states that "[t]he meaning and scope of even
such a basic term as 'legal person' can be modified by reason of changes in scientific
facts-the unborn child has been recognized as a legal person, even in the law of torts."
Id. at 35.
43. PROssER 355.
44. E.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d
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One example of this preference has arisen because of the advances
of medicine in the science of fetology. Techniques have now been
developed to make lifesaving transfusions of blood to fetuses who
have developed acute anemia in the womb caused by the incompati-
bility of the fetus' blood with the mother's blood.4 5  Where the
parent by religious conviction has believed it sinful to permit a blood
transfusion, a conflict of interest between fetus and parent has oc-
curred. In one such case in which the hospital involved sought a
court order authorizing the transfusion, Judge Wright observed: "The
state, as parens patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child,
and so it should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary abandon-
ments. The [mother] had a responsibility to the community to care
for her infant. '46
Judge Wright's dictum was followed in the similar New Jersey
case of Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson.4r
Again, one of the most fundamental of constitutional rights, the right to
practice one's religious beliefs, had been asserted. It might be expected
that this most fundamental right would have led the court to subordinate
the fetus' interest in survival to the constitutional right of the parents to
practice their religion and thereby effect an abortion by denying blood
to the fetus. Instead, the life of the fetus was treated as having a value
outweighing even this most valued constitutional liberty.18  The court
found no difference between the present case of a fetus likely to be
aborted if denied blood, and the case of a "blue baby" suffering
from lack of oxygen after birth.49 In a unanimous per curiam opinion
the court declared: "We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled
to the law's protection. . . . We [had] no difficulty in so deciding
with respect to [an] infant child."5
This choice between the interests of the fetus and the civil rights
of the parents has been presented in a different context in California.
Kyne v. Kyne5' was a suit brought by a fetus' guardian ad litem when
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42
N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
45. H. LILEY, MODERN MOTmEaHOOD 42 (1967).
46. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000,
1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
47. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
48. Id. at 422, 201 A.2d at 538.
49. In State v. Perricone, 37 N.J 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890
(1962), the New Jersey court had ordered a transfusion for a "blue baby" suffering
from lack of oxygen despite the parents religious objections.
50. 42 N.J. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
51. 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806 (1940).
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the fetus was less than six months old seeking to compel the father to
provide support. The court applied section 196a of the Civil Code,
which provided that "[t]he father as well as the mother of an illegiti-
mate child must give him support and education suitable to his circum-
stances." The court held that section 29 of the Civil Code52 "must
be read together with section 196a so as to confer the right on an un-
born child through a guardian ad litem to compel the right to support
conferred by the code.""3
The court fortified its conclusion with a reference to Scott v. Mc-
Pheeters54 and People v. Yates.55  In the latter case, the appellate
department of the superior court invoked section 270 of the Penal Code
to protect a fetus. The statute makes it a misdemeanor for a father to
wilfully fail "to furnish food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance or
other remedial care" to his "child," and "child" is defined by the stat-
ute to include "a child conceived but not yet born." The court held
that a misdemeanor was committed by failure to supply food and care
to the fetus, even though such food and care would be supplied by the
mother indirectly.56
It would be strange if a fetus had rights to support from his
parents, rights enforceable by a guardian and sanctioned by the crim-
inal law, and yet have no right to be protected from an abortion. By
the same token, it would be incongruous that a fetus should be protected
by the state from wilful harm by a parent when the injury was inflicted
indirectly (e.g., by refusal to permit blood transfusion), but not when it
was inflicted directly by abortion. The California decisions recognize
that where a choice must be made between the life of the fetus and the
convenience or desires of the parents, the law will make the parents
subordinate their interests in order to preserve the life in the womb.
A Locus of Rights
The law has found a recognizable locus of human rights in the fetus
from the time of its conception. It would be hard to pretend that this
convergent development of property, tort, welfare, and constitutional
law was at the dictate of some hidden and impermissible theological im-
52. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
53. 38 Cal. App. 2d at 127, 100 P.2d at 809.
54. Case discussed in text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
55. 114 Cal. App. 782, 298 P. 961 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1931). Scott v. Mc-
Pheeters and People v. Yates were referred to in 38 Cal. App. 2d at 127-28, 100 P.2d at
809.
56. 114 Cal. App. at 788, 298 P. at 963; accord, People v. Sianes, 134 Cal. App.
355, 25 P.2d 487 (1933).
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pulse. Such sturdy guardians of secular good sense as Justice Buller57
and Chief Justice Shaw5 invented no imaginary being by holding that
the unborn child could have rights of inheritance. It is equally un-
likely that Professor Prosser, when he found all commentators treating
a fetus in the womb on a par with the mother who was in the path of
an automobile, was indulging in metaphysical fantasy.59 Provisions in
several California statutes that a conceived child is to be treated like a
born child were certainly not an exercise in fiction-making by the legis-
lature, nor have California courts imposed some artificial concept upon
the world by treating the unborn as possessor of rights.60
That the California approach is not some local peculiarity is testi-
fied to by the convergence of American decisions in this area, and action
taken by the United Nations indicates that this is not just a national
aberration. In 1959, the United Nations adopted a 'Declaration of the
Rights of the Child" which supplemented its statement entitled the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One reason for this supple-
mentary declaration was stated in its Preamble to be that "the child, by
reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards
and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after
birth."61 Thus, the representatives of most of the civilized nations of
the world recognized not only that a human being before birth deserves
to be treated as a "child," but also that a child, so defined, needs legal
protection. The rights asserted by the United Nations, as applicable to
the fetus, represent a commitment to which all the various social systems
represented within that worldwide body have acceded.62
If the fetus can inherit by will and by intestacy, be the beneficiary
of a trust, be tortiously injured, be represented by a guardian seeking
present support from the parent, be preferred to the religious liberties
of the parent, and be protected by the penal statutes from parental
neglect, then legal interests exist here that the state may protect from
intentional extinction as well.
Countervailing Interests
The Life and Health of the Mother
The clearest countervailing value to the life of the fetus is the life
57. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 16, 19-20 & 55-56 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
61. G.A. Res. 1386, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 19, U.N. Doe. A/4354 (1959)
(adopted unanimously) (emphasis added).
62. See U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm. 593 (1959).
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of the mother who carries it. In the rare case where a choice must be
made between them, reason cannot demand that the mother must prefer
her unborn child's life to her own. The usual state statute recognizes
that an abortion may be performed if "necessary to preserve" the
mother's life."' In California the definition of "preserve" has been ex-
panded by the courts to include preservation of the mother's life in the
sense of preventing ill health from shortening it.64 Packer and Gampell
found in their survey that in practice 17 out of 21 hospitals would per-
form an abortion when there was a "substantial probability" that con-
tinuance of the pregnancy would affect the duration of the mother's
life.65
When there is no grave maternal disease making pregnancy ex-
tremely hazardous to the mother, the usual statute has preferred the in-
terest of the fetus in life to the mother's interest in health.66 Statutes
like the present sections 25950-25954 of the Health and Safety Code
raise a serious constitutional question, however. These provisions of
the code permit abortion if pregnancy presents substantial risk to the
physical or mental health of the mother. If the health justification is
interpreted to make the good health of the mother superior to the life
of the fetus, it would appear that one class of persons is being denied the
equal protection of the law, on the ground that the lives of the persons in
this class are being taken to secure the less vital interests of another
class. It seems constitutionally impermissible to deny protection of the
law to beings recognized as persons in property, tort, and the Civil
Code; yet the health justification could be interpreted in a traditional
way as a recognition of the interest of the mother in being free from a
63. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 274; NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney
1967).
64. See, e.g., People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959):
"Surely the abortion statute (Pen. Code § 274) does not mean by the words 'unless the
same is necessary to preserve her life' that the peril to life be imminent. It ought to
be enough that the dangerous condition 'be potentially present . . . .' Nor was it
essential that the doctor should believe that the death of the patient would be other-
wise certain in order to justify him ...... Id. at 814, 335 P.2d at 212 (court's em-
phasis).
65. Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine,
11 STAN. L. REV. 417, 439 (1959). Most physicians use the term "therapeutic
abortion" to mean an abortion "produced ethically because of some grave maternal
disease which [makes] continuation of the pregnancy extremely hazardous." N. EAST-
MAN, EXPECTANT MOTHERHOOD 112 (4th rev. ed. 1963).
66. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 274; NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 125.05 (Mc-
Kinney 1967). See People v. Pollum, 97 Cal. App. 2d 173, 217 P.2d 463 (1950),
where the conviction for abortion was sustained even though the prosecutrix had lost
much weight during the pregnancy, was in an anemic condition, had been advised that
she could not undergo normal childbirth, and that a Caesarian operation would be
required.
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life-shortening disease, or in the realization that physicians must have
some latitude in determining what conditions threaten life. Few preg-
nancies carry an imminent risk to life, but a number of them threaten life
by a substantial impairment of health; therefore, to balance a mother's
interest in being free from a life-shortening disease against the fetus' in-
terest in life may not overstep the constitutional line. Analogy is af-
forded by the usual rule treating as justifiable homicide killing done to
repel a threat of substantial bodily injury.67 A rule of self-preservation
where life is balanced against life does not offend the respect which the
constitution demands for the life of every person.
The Physician's Professional Judgment
The position most recently taken by the House of Delegates of the
American Medical Association (similar to the one proposed in a draft
by the American Law Institute) is that abortion should be prohibited
by the state except on precise and limited grounds.68 The resolution
declares that "the American Medical Association is opposed to induced
abortion" except in a limited number of circumstances under conditions
that include examination of the patient by two additional physicians
and performance of the operation "in a hospital accredited by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. 0 9
The unrestricted freedom of the physician to prescribe or perform
abortions is not a freedom sought by the medical profession. It is, more-
over, at odds with one of the oldest traditions of the medical profession,
the Hippocratic Oath, which is still called to the mind of many young
doctors on their graduation from medical school: "[I pledge] not to
give a deadly drug (pharmakon) to anyone if asked for it, nor suggest
it. Similarly, I will not give a woman an abortifacient pessury. In
purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art."
'70
The consequences, furthermore, of a broad claim that the state
cannot intervene between professional judgment and patient should be
considered. There has been a gradual change within the medical pro-
fession in the concept of a physician's duty. From a duty of treating
the specific ills of a patient, this duty has evolved in the minds of some
leaders of the profession into a duty of keeping the patient in "health."
"Health" in this context is understood to encompass not only free-
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
68. House of Delegates of the American Medical Association, AMA Policy on
Therapeutic Abortion, 201 J.A.M.A. 544 (1967). Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §
230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
69. House of Delegates of the American Medical Association, AMA Policy on
Therapeutic Abortion, 201 J.A.M.A. 544 (1967).
70. THE HnPocRAvnc OATH 3 (Edelstein ed. 1943).
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dom from physical disease but also a state of good relations within a
community network.71 If the physician is to seek health in this ex-
panded, positive sense, the matters subject to his professional good
judgment are infinite. If the state could not constitutionally regulate
the exercise of that judgment, legislators and courts alike would be
superfluous, supplanted by a wise elite of doctors. In a democratic
society, trust cannot be placed with a body of experts to determine issues
of life and death, however qualified, well motivated and devoted that
body may be. The balancing of vital interests must be done, not by a
professional elite, but by the representatives of the community.
The Interest of Marital Privacy
There is an interest of husband and wife in preserving their conjugal
relations from state interference, an interest which, in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,72 was found to be violated by Connecticut's statute forbidding
the use of contraceptives. The law, which interfered with the most
private aspect of the marital relation, sexual intercourse, was more strin-
gent and sweeping than any statute, civil or ecclesiastic, in the history
of social efforts to control contraception.73 It made it criminal for a
married couple to engage in sexual intercourse when using contracep-
tives; enforcement required actual invasion of the marital bedchamber.
In contrast, the usual statute restricting abortions does not affect
the sexual relations of husband and wife. Pregnancy does not interfere
with these relations except under some circumstances and only for a
limited time.74 Prevention of abortion does not entail, therefore, state
interference with the right of marital intercourse; nor does enforcement
of the statute require invasions of the conjugal bedroom.
Assuming arguendo that there are other marital rights the state
must respect, may it then be urged that one of these rights is the freedom
of a married couple not to have, raise, and educate a child they do not
want? Certainly from the viewpont of both the parents and the child
it is important that the child be wanted; but the parents' attitude toward
their offspring cannot be made the single criterion of the fetus' right to
continue in existence.
In this area there has been a gradual evolution of civilized thought.
In the Roman Republic, the father, by virtue of the patria potestas,
71. See Constitution of the World Health Organization, opened for signature
July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
72. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73. See generally J. NOONAN, CONTRACEPTION 491 (paperback ed. 1965).
74. See GUTTMACHER, PREGNANCY AND BIRTH 88 (1962).
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had the literal power of life or death over his children. 75 "Within the
family the paterfamilias enjoyed a lifelong despotism .... -76 In
the Roman Empire, however, this freedom to deal with one's children as
one pleased was limited by the state, although infanticide was still widely
practiced, and abortion with the consent of the father was legal.77 The
basic concept of the law was that a fetus was a part of the woman.78
No protection was accorded to this being within the womb, rather the
law guarded the father's right to determine this being's destiny.
It was only as the boundaries of the modem Western European
nations began to form that laws were adopted protecting the fetus. In
England only the fetus that was already formed was protected; 79 it
was not until 1803 that English criminal law, following the judicial lead
given by the property cases, safeguarded the fetus at all stages of exist-
ence.80 In the nineteenth century the American states followed this
English precedent.8"
Thus over a period of about 2500 years a defense has been built
up by the state in behalf of children, born and unborn, against the
aggressive and proprietary instincts of their progenitors. There is no
evidence that the child of today is any less in need of the restraint
placed by the law upon parental action.8 2
The evolution that occurred in criminal law, as has been indicated,
followed the path set in the property cases; and the property cases, in
turn, followed the development in medical knowledge. Prior to the
seventeenth century the prevailing doctrine had been based upon Aris-
totle's notion that 40 days after conception the fetus underwent a trans-
formation that placed him in the human class. This notion was success-
fully attacked as metaphysical nonsense in 1621 by Paolo Zacchia's
Quaestiones Medico-Legales.8 3  Thereafter, the medical profession
gradually accepted the view that there was no valid line to be drawn
within the womb; the law followed the medical lead.
75. B. BIONDI, IL DIrrro ROMANO 90-91 (1957).
76. W. BUCKLAND & A. McNArR, ROMAN LAW & COMMON LAW 35 (1936).
77. J. NOONAN, supra note 73, at 113.
78. See DIGEST 24.4.1.1 (Digest of Justinian).
79. 2 H. BRAcroN, DE LEGMUS ET CONsUETmDINMus 279 (Twiss ed. 1879).
See generally Noonan, Abortion and the Catholic Church: 4 Summary History, 12
NATURAL L.F. 128 (1967).
80. 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, § 2 at 758 (1803).
81. See J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF STATrORY CRIUMES § 746
(2d ed. 1883).
82. See generally Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegmueller & Silver, The Battered-
Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962).
83. P. ZACCEA, QuABSnoNEs MEDICO-LEGALEs 9.1 (1621).
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Today there can scarcely be a return to the Roman law theory
that a parent has absolute dominion over his offspring or to the ancient
notion that a fetus is "part" of his mother. The new science of fetology,
brought into existence by Liley's work on blood transfusions to the fe-
tus, has destroyed old myths.84 The organs and the blood of the fetus
are his own; at six weeks, the features of his face are visible; they are
the features of a human face.85 Even the persistent belief that the
placenta was part of the mother has been exploded. 86 "More than
any living species," the fetus "dominates his environment." 87
The head, housing the miraculous brain, is quite large in proportion
to the remainder of the body, and the limbs are still relatively
small. Within his watery world, however (where we have been
able to observe him in his natural state through a sort of closed-
circuit x-ray television set), he is quite beautiful, perfect in his
fashion, active and graceful. He is neither a quiescent vegetable
nor a witless tadpole, as some have conceived him to be in the past,
but rather a tiny human being, as independent as though he were
lying in a crib with a blanket wrapped around him instead of his
mother. 88
Medical developments confirm the soundness of the law in treating the
fetus as a being with rights not dependent on his parents.
It has come to be seen that "the nine months spent by the individual
in the womb are fundamental. It is during these nine prenatal months
that the individual's foundations are . . . laid . . . . To an extent
rather more profound than we had hitherto suspected, the individual's
prenatal past influences his postnatal future."'' 9 The individual in the
womb is now seen, in the light of increased scientific evidence, as
physically and intellectually in a continuum with the individual after
birth. The most fundamental way the prenatal past could affect the
individual's postnatal future would be if it were killed in the womb. The
thrust of modern medicine is to assure that the individual will not be
killed, but will be given maximum protection: "We may not ever be able
to guarantee a perfect uterine environment for every baby, but certainly,
at this very time, by doing what is necessary, we can see to it that every
84. "Liley's pioneering work not only has opened new avenues in the treatment
of erythroblastosis fetalis, but has inspired the whole new subspecialty of 'fetology' and
created a need for fetological surgeons and fetological medical specialists for the future."
Montague, Hemolytic Disease of the Fetus, in INTRA-UTERINE DEVELOPMENT 443, 455
(A. Barnes ed. 1968).
85. See H. LILEY, supra note 45, at 28.
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id. at 23.
88. Id. at 26-27.
89. A. MONTAGUE, PRENATAL INFLUENCE 500 (1962).
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baby enjoys as nearly optimum a uterine environment as it is humanly
possible to secure."90  If the baby is to be assured a nearly optimum
environment, he cannot be liable to destruction at the will of his parent.
Conclusion
The claim of freedom over one's body is, of course, a self-evident
right if it means that a woman should be free to refuse sexual inter-
course or free to practice contraception. 91 A woman is not under the
necessity of subjecting her body to the burden of pregnancy if she chooses
either of these alternatives; but the further claim that a woman is free
to destroy the being whom she has conceived through voluntary sexual
intercourse makes sense only if that being can be regarded as part
of herself, a part she may discard for her own good. But at this point
the evolution favoring freedom for women encounters the evolution
favoring the recognition of the fetus as a living person within the womb
-an evolution supported by the data of biology and the precedents of
property, tort, constitutional, and welfare law.
90. Id.
91. See People v. Belous, 71 AC. 996, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969)
(dictum). In this 4-3 decision, the court held unconstitutionally vague the old Califor-
nia abortion statute, CAL. PEN. CODE § 274.
November 19691

